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Résumé: Cet article propose une étude théorique des nouvelles générations de Marques 
de Distributeurs dans le secteur alimentaire. Nous proposons un modèle 
original de relation verticale, intégrant l'existence d'un marché intermédiaire 
de type concurrentiel (marché spot) parallèlement à la mise en place d'une 
relation contractuelle privilégiée entre une partie des producteurs amont et un 
distributeur. On montre alors sous quelles conditions les producteurs 
impliqués et le distributeur vont effectivement mettre en place ce type de 
démarches. Il apparaît néanmoins qu'à l'inverse des producteurs, les 
distributeurs et les consommateurs peuvent préférer une amélioration légiférée 
de la qualité par un renforcement des standards de qualité minimum. 
 
Abstract: This article gives a theoretical analysis of a new type of private labels in the 
food sector. We propose an original model of vertical relationship between 
producers and retailers which takes into account two supply sources through 
(i) a competitive spot market and (ii) supply contracts. We study how the 
producers and retailers could cooperate to set up these new labels. However it 
appears that retailers and consumers could prefer the stepping up of minimum 
quality standards rather than this type of private labels. 
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the safety crises of the past ten years in the food sector, supermarket chains have
involved theirselves in radically new relationships with their upstream suppliers. Even as the
public authorities were tightening Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) and creating new control
procedures, new labelling strategies were being adopted by certain retailers on the basis of a closer
involvement in upstream farming. Initially developed in the meat sector which had been directly
impacted by the “mad cow” crisis, these procedures next spread to other sectors, such as fruits
and vegetables, fish, cheeses and wines.
The main large scale retailers, whose image had suﬀered due to this unprecedented crisis in
food consumption, sought ways of satisfying consumer expectations for transparency and product
safety guarantees. In the United Kingdom, procedures developed in the meat sector by Sainsbury,
Marks and Spencer or Tesco are good examples (Fearne, 1998). For France, the Carrefour example
can be cited with the development of “Carrefour Quality Chain” supply agreements with producer
groups. At the beginning of 2003, Carrefour has already set up over 250 partnership agreements
with over 35,000 producers (see Codron et al. (2003) and Mazé (2002) for the european experience).
In the United States, several studies show the increasing market shares of private labels and the
development of contracts between retailers and producers in the fresh produce sector (Calvin and
Cook, 2001).
One important aspect of these new procedures is that they are directed towards constructing
“Premium Private Labels” (PPL). These PPL represent a new generation of private labels set up by
the retailers which diﬀer fundamentally from those set up in the 70s. Indeed, PPL place themselves
at a higher level of price than that of unbranded products (here refered to as “generic products”)
with guarantees for consumers to better take quality, food safety and environmental security into
account. They therefore require stricter production specifications for upstream producers and
greater involvement of retailers in drawing them up. From then on, product credibility depends
on a displayed partnership between retailers and the production sector upstream.
There is a relatively extensive literature on private label as they have taken on considerable
importance over the past twenty years in most developed countries (see, for example, Salmon and
Cmar (1987), Hoch and Banerji (1993). Most of these works aim to understand the competitive
interaction between private label and producers’ brands. They examine to what degree these
procedures create value and how, depending on the case, this created value is shared among the
various stakeholders. Mills (1995) oﬀers such an analysis of a producer-retailer relationship in which
the producer’s brand (referred to as national brand) and the private label are in competition in the
market. This author shows how the private label enhances retailer performance (i) by redirecting
sales which previously went to national brand towards private label supplied at a lower gross cost
and (ii) by increasing the margins won from the national brand. Other works extend this type
of analysis by placing the accent on the diﬀerentiation strategy choice and examine the quality
and price positionning of the store brands compared to the existing national brands (Bontems et
al., 1999; Connor and Peterson, 1992; Slade, 1995; Raju et al., 1995 and Cotteril et al., 2000)
propose diﬀerent econometric methods to estimate market shares and price interactions between
private labels and manufacturers’ brands. Hosh (1996), Quelsh and Harding (1996) and Mills (1999)
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analyse the counterstrategies the manufacturer is able to adopt in order to reduce the bargaining
power of the retailer.
The main part of these works stresses on the power shifting to the retailers and show that the
private label are positioned at lower retail price and quality levels than the national brands or
like close substitutes to these national brands. However, Dunne and Narasimhan (1999) (see also
Dunne, 1999) give the example of Loblaws, the largest Canadian Grocery, which added the new
Premium President’s Choice line to its traditional unbranded product. The marketing messages of
Loblaws stress the quality of the ingredients and the preparation of President’s Choice. Its olive oil,
for example, is claimed to be “harvested from trees planted more than 80 years ago and produced
from the first cold pressing of sunripened olives”, that it means higher quality and production
costs. It is exactly the same type of marketing messages which are used by the retailers in the
meat and fresh produce sectors about the quality, safety and environmental guarantees given by
the PPL.
The goal of this paper is to analyze this new generation of private label and to get deeper
insight about (i) why retailers set up such procedures, (ii) to what extent suppliers have interest
to involve in it, and (iii) what are the consequences for the consumers. To evaluate these new
procedures, several elements must be taken into account:
- The degree of diﬀerentiation of the PPL compared to the generic product. This degree of
diﬀerentiation is determined by the specification imposed by the retailer. Additional costs are then
induced according to the quality level of the product and the reinforcement of controls carried out
at all levels of the chain, by both stakeholders and outside control and certification organizations.
- The retail prices and the consumer willingness to pay. Both of these criteria depend not only
on the degree of diﬀerentiation compared to the standard product, but also on communication
policies, that is to say, the investment in marketing undertaken to publicize the product and
reassure consumers about its characteristics.
- The buying and selling alternatives available to the suppliers and the retailers. Depending on
the degree of exclusivity of the relationship, each of them can have alternatives for distributing
or ordering the diﬀerentiated product on other networks. This possibility has two eﬀects: for the
producer, threatening to ration the retailer can improve his bargaining power and make it possible
for him to capture more of the created value; for the retailer, threatening to set up competition
between several competitors all capable of supplying the diﬀerentiated product gives him more
negotiating power.
To quantify the economic impact of these diﬀerent elements, we propose an original vertical
relationship model which integrates the existence of an intermediary spot market in parallel with
a contractual privileged relationship (i.e a PPL) between part of the upstream producers and the
retailer. To begin with we consider an arbitrarily large number of upstream producers susceptible of
supplying the downstream retailers in the chain. One such retailer decides to set up a higher quality
product than that presently oﬀered to consumers (the “generic” quality product) and, hence, gives
higher guarantees than the other retailers. This PPL is associated with the implementation of a
specification with a subset of producers who develop the higher quality product. Generic quality
supply for all retailers goes through the spot market fed by the overall group of producers. This
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generic quality is defined by public authorities and corresponds to a MQS. Under these conditions,
if we interest ourselves in the impact of the producer-retailer relationship on the nature of the
food oﬀer made to the consumers, the strategic decision which is important to study is that of
the quality/price positioning of the PPL. This decision is linked to an increase in production costs
with quality resulting in a higher end price and a smaller share of the shelf space dedicated to the
diﬀerentiated product. The PPL operators are, hence, faced with the following alternative: either
the qualitative diﬀerentiation of the PPL compared to the standard product is low along with a low
diﬀerence between its production cost and retail price compared to the standard while a large part
of the food oﬀer takes advantage of a “little plus” in terms of quality and safety guaranties; or the
qualitatively diﬀerentiation is strong, resulting in contrast to higher costs and a higher retail price,
but for considerable quality and security guaranties on only a small part of the retail shelf space.
We show how the PPL can go beyond the highest quality of the standard susceptible of being set
up by the public authorities. At the same time, we show that the interest of the producers can
diverge from that of the retailer involved in the PPL. In contrast to the producers, it seems that
the retailers and the consumers could, in fact, prefer regulated product improvement through the
reinforcement of the MQS. This reinforcement would lead to limiting PPL supply, even to totally
eliminating it. In other terms, creation of PPL could, paradoxically, be carried out more in the
interest of the producers than in that of the retailers.
Our article is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we describe our model in the
absence of the PPL and we solve it to define a reference for the vertical relationship. Section 3
fixes the analytic framework of an PPL by defining the optimal quality and supply for the markets
for a fixed MQS. Section 4 is dedicated to the influence this standard has on producer and retailer
profits, as well as on the consumer surplus. Section 5 closes the article by referring to possible
extensions of the model.
2 Benchmark Modelling
The analytic framework of the initial situation is shown in figure 1. Consider a set of J producers
oﬀering an identical product represented by a quality index k0 > 0. The parameter k0 corresponds
to a MQS to which all the producers are subjected. In this first phase we suppose that the producers
have no possibility of improving quality beyond the level of the standard.
Each producer has an identical production capacity α =
K
J
(where K is the total capacity of all
the producers) and supplies an intermediary market supplying R retailers. Each retailer thus finds
himself in the position of a monopoly 1to supply a “reserved” market of the size Mr (r = 1, ..., R)
1This assumption can be justified by the fact that consumers choose ex ante the store according to general features
like location, product diversity and general level of prices and quality and not by comparing for each specific product
the oﬀers of the diﬀerent retailers (Chardon and Dumartin, 1998). It means that it is not relevant for our purpose
to assume a price competition for each specific product between the diﬀerent supermarkets chains. Otherwise, since
Holton (1957) the theoretical literature dealing with retailing has been taking into account the shopping costs. These
shopping costs are important to consider because the consumers buy usually several products in the store. This
point also justifies our assumption insofar we limit our analysis to only one product (see Chambolle (2002) for a
competitive analysis of multiproduct retailers).
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and we pose M =
RX
r=1
Mr
The intermediary market is taken to be a competitive market on which the price ω0 results from
the balance between the upstream producers’ oﬀer and the downstream retailers’ demand. The
k0 quality results in a unit production and certification cost covered by the producers upstream.
We designate this unit cost c0 and retain the quadratic specification c0 = ck20 (c ≥ 0). Hence,
for a fixed price ω0, an upstream producer’s profit j (j = 1, ..., J) oﬀering quantity q is written
Bj(q) = (ω0 − c0)q. Under these conditions, a producer has only two possibilities: either oﬀer
quantity α if ω0 ≥ c0, or oﬀer nothing if ω0 < c0. When ω0 ≥ c0 the total quantity oﬀered on the
intermediary market is inelastic and is equal to K.
[………………………]
 J  producers (K, total capacity)
Spot Market
price  ω0
1 2 R -1 R……Retailers
End Market
k0
quality k0
k0 k0 k0
1−Rx Rx2x1x
Producers
Figure 1 : Producer-retailer relationship in the absence of a PPL
We consider that the price ω0 is imposed upon each retailer r but that each of them is free to
choose the quantity xr he needs depending on the demand of the final market. On this market of
the size Mr, consumers are distinguished by a θ taste parameter compared to the quality oﬀered
and we suppose that the θ parameter is uniformly distributed over the [0, θ] interval. As Mussa
and Rosen (1978), we consider that the surplus of a consumer of θ type buying a unit of k quality
product at price p is given by the expression S(θ) = θk − p.2 In this case, only those consumers
allowing S(θ) ≥ 0 (θ ≥ p
k
) buy the goods. Hence, for the reference situation defined above (i.e in
the case where only quality k0 is oﬀered at price p0) total demand dr(k0, p0) for each retailer r on
the end market is written:
dr(k0, p0) =
Mr
θ
(θ − p0
k0
) (1)
2See, for example, Latouche et al. (2000), Dickinson and DeeVon Bailey (2002), Lusk et al. (2003) for assesment
of the consumers willingness to pay stronger guarantess in food safety, quality and environmental security after the
“mad cow” crisis.
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Using the equation (1) one can write the inverse demand function describing the price p0(xr)
depending on quantity xr purchased on the intermediary market and resold on the end market:
p0(xr) =
θk0
Mr
(Mr − xr) (2)
We thus give the profit of retailer r buying quantity xr on the intermediary market at price
ω0 and valorizing it at price p0(xr) on the end market as Πr(xr) = (p0(xr)− ω0)xr. The optimal
quantity of xr placed on the market is therefore given by:
xr =
Mr
2θk0
(θk0 − ω0) (3)
Under such conditions, the retailers’ total demand D(ω0) on the intermediary market is such
that D(ω0) =
NX
r=1
xr. Accordingly, the price ω∗0, balancing out the total oﬀer K and the demand
D(ω0), is given by the following equation (3):
ω∗0 = θk0(1− 2ξ) (4)
The parameter ξ =
K
M
(ξ ≤ 1
2
) expresses the relationship between the producers’ total oﬀer
and the global size of the downstream market (which we call the “relative capacity of the oﬀer”
on the market). As shown by equation (4), the intermediary price ω∗0 shrinks naturally depending
on the ξ parameter and grows depending on quality k0 (since the demand on the end market also
grows according to k0). What is more, this price ω∗0 remains superior to the cost c0 as long as the
following condition is met:
k0 ≤ k0 =
θ(1− 2ξ)
c
(5)
Hence, if the k0 standard is not too high and remains inferior to the threshold value k0, each
producer receives positive profit by oﬀering his total production capacity. Above the k0 threshold,
quality becomes too expensive to produce and the producers can no longer supply the intermediary
market. The k0 threshold thus corresponds to a maximum value for fixing the MQS. One can also
see that the k0 threshold shrinks so directly according to the ξ parameter that an increase in the
oﬀer upstream of the production chain limits the possibilities of fixing a minimum quality standard.
Finally, by using (2),(3) and (4), we find that each retailer buys quantity xr at price ω∗0 and
resells it on the end market at price p0 defined by:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ xr =Mrξ r = 1, ..., R
p0 = θk0(1− ξ)
(6)
The profit Bj of each producer j (j = 1, ..., J) and the profit Πr of each retailer r (r = 1, ..., R)
are, then, written as: ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ Bj = αk0[θ(1− 2ξ)− ck0] j = 1, ..., J
Πr =Mrθk0ξ2 r = 1, ..., R
(7)
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Of course the retailer’s Πr profit is a increasing k0 since he does not finance the production
and certification costs linked to this level of quality. On the other hand, Bj profit is a concave
function, optimized for the
k0
2
value, which corresponds to the “ideal” value of the MQS from the
producers’ point of view.
Insofar as only the k0 quality is oﬀered on the market, the surplus Wc(k0) obtained for the
consumers, customers of retailer R, is written simply:
Wc(k0) =MR[
Z θ
p0/k0
(θk0 − p0)f(θ)dθ] =
MRθk0ξ
2
2
(8)
Here again the Wc(k0) surplus is increasing in k0. This result is a direct consequence of
the hypothesis we adopted on the form of production costs. Indeed, the linear character of the
functional form retained leads to an maladaptation of the quantities placed on the market according
to the level of the k0 standard (if not when this standard passes the k0 threshold level). An eﬀect
of p0 price increase depending on scarcity is thus eliminated, with the result that consumers always
prefer enhanced quality. Hence, a quality standard restrained by reference to a maximum retained
value can only be explained by its interest for the upstream producers, never by its interest for
retailers or consumers.
3 Premium Private Label modelling
Now we will envisage the creation of a PPL on the market. The analytic framework is shown
on figure 2. We consider the existence of a group of G producers upstream of the market. This
producer group is represented by a sole entity capable of making strategic production and sales
decisions for all the members of the group. Each member’s capacity constraint is identical to the
α value defined in the preceding section.
We study the possibility of setting up a partnership (which we call an “integrated chain”)
between the producer group and retailer R. The goal of this integrated chain is to divert part
of the exchanges carried out on the spot market3 and to constitute a PPL which is diﬀerentiated
from the MQS k04 . This PPL is characterized by superior quality valorized by consumers on the
end market. More precisely, a PPL corresponds to a partnership between a producer group and
retailer R in order to:
i) oﬀer consumers a k1 quality product with k1 > k0;
ii) define the quantities xR and yR, respectively, which can be sold for the qualities k0 and k1.
3Our model is quite similar to the Xia and Sexton’s model (2003) which simultaneously takes into account a
contractual relationship between producers and retailers and a spot market . However, these authors do not assume
a product diﬀerentiation between the contractual relationship and the spot market. The contract does not allow a
higher intermediary price than on the spot market. Our model is designed to analyze this possibility.
4We show further that if there is no diﬀerentiation between k0 and the PPL, we get the same results than with
the benchmark.
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Retailers
End Market
Producers […………]
Group of G producers
Spot Market
price   ω0
1 2 ……
k0 k1k0
J-G  producers
k0 k0 k0 k0 k1
Rx Ry
Ry
1x 2x
1−Rx
RyG −α
R -1 R
Figure 2 : Setting up a PPL
Hence, as shown in figure 2, the producer group supplies retailer R a yR part of their production
potential in superior quality with the rest, αG− yR, being placed on the spot market. To simplify
the analysis, we will work within the hypothetical framework of the group always supplying the
spot market, that is to say, the relative number of suppliers involved is suﬃciently high. We retain
the hypothesis (H1) defined by:
(H1) β =
αG
MR
≥ ξ
So, retailer R this time oﬀers two qualities to his clientele. By identifying the bθ consumer taste
indiﬀerently between the purchase of the k0 quality product, sold at the p0 price and the purchase
of the k1 quality product, sold at the price p1 (bθ = p1 − p0
k1 − k0
), one obtains the quantities demanded
in k0 and k1 qualities sold, respectively, at prices p0 and p1 :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
d0(k0, k1, p0, p1) =
MR
θ
(
p1 − p0
k1 − k0
− p0
k0
)
d1(k0, k1, p0, p1) =
MR
θ
(θ − p1 − p0
k1 − k0
)
(9)
Using the same methodology as in the preceding section, we inverse the system (9) to obtain
prices p0(xR, yR) and p1(xR, yR) in function of quantities xR and yR placed on the retailer R
market at, respectively, qualities k0 and k1.¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
p0(xR, yR) =
θk0
MR
(MR − xR − yR)
p1(xR, yR) =
θ
MR
(k1MR − k0xR − k1yR)
(10)
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Insofar as the set of parameters for the model is common knowledge, we consider that the
producer group and the retailer dimension the k1 superior quality to oﬀer consumers in such a
way that quantities xR and yR are oﬀered on the end market. Production of the new k1 quality
leads to increased unit production and certification costs for the quality, which are measured by
∆c = c1− c0 with c1 = ck21. In practice, covering these extra costs is shared by the producer group
and retailer R. For this reason, we retain that a λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) part is paid by the retailer and a
(1− λ) part by the producer group. The integrated chain profit is:
Π(k1, xR, yR) = (p1(xR, yR)− c1)yR + (p0(xR, yR)− ω0)xR + (ω0 − c0)(αG− yR) (11)
The problem is then how to optimize the Π(k1, xR, yR) profit in function of the three quality
and quantity arguments. Still, it is not sure that production and sales of a k1 6= k0 superior quality
is really optimal from the joint profit point of view defined above. Trade oﬀ for the integrated chain
must be carried out specifically in function of the k0 MQS as well as in function of the increased
production costs linked to developing the k1 quality. One first obtains the following result5 :
Proposition 1
Posing ek0 = θ
2c
, the integrated chain chooses to produce a k1 > k0 superior quality if and only
if k0 < Min{ek0 , k0}. In this case, the integrated chain chooses to supply the k0 and k1 qualities
in non nul quantities if and only if k0 > k0 = ek0(1− 3ξ).
Proposition 1 gives immediate portrayal of the importance fixing the level of the MQS has on
the private incentive to develop a superior quality product. Hence, if this standard is too high and
exceeds the ek
0 value, the producer group and retailer will not see any interest in developing the
PPL. On the other hand, if the MQS is too low, (k0 ≤ k0), the integrated chain develops a PPL
while eliminating supply of the k0 standard. It must also be taken into account that in the case of
strong relative capacity of the oﬀer on the market, (ξ >
1
4
), one obtains ek0 > k0 and the PPL is
systematically developed.
Under these conditions, and as will later see, the question for the public authorities is to know
whether to fix a low standard, favoring private investment and making it possible to segment the
market (by the creation of a PPL heavily supplied in the linear) or, on the contrary, to raise the
standard in order to minimize the amplitude of PPL development. However, to judge the eﬃciency
of arbitration of public policy, it is first of all important to assess the diversity of the products
oﬀered, supply and the pricing practiced for the k0 and k1qualities. We will carry out this initial
analysis by placing ourselves within the framework of hypothesis (H2) defined hereunder:
(H2) k0 ≤ k0 ≤ k0
The hypothesis k0 ≤ k0 is placed in the situation defined by (4) of an eﬀective existence of
an intermediary market. The hypothesis k0 ≤ k0 makes it possible to simplify the analysis at
the technical level without drawing into question the main results that we want to bring to light.
5All the demonstrations are detailled in the appendix.
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Within this framework of analysis, the two qualities k0 and k1 will systematically be supplied and
it will be possible for us to obtain a simple analytical expression of optimal PPL quality from
the point of view of the integrated chain.6 We first show an initial result of intermediary price
invariance:
Proposition 2
Under (H1)-(H2) and if k0 < ek0 = θ
2c
, no matter what the level of quality k1 of the PPL, the
spot market price remains identical to the market price ω∗0 = θk0(1−2ξ), obtained in the reference
situation. The total quantity of supply for the market of retailer R is such that xR + yR ≡ ξMR.
The first consequence of proposition 2 is that if a retailer develops a PPL it will not change
the remuneration of producers not engaged by this retailer. Diverting part of the oﬀer on the
intermediary market is exactly compensated by a drop in the demand of retailer R on this market,
thus explaining the invariance in the price ω∗0. Hence, a PPL is developed only in the interest of
the contracting parties and no externality, positive or negative, on the profit of the other producers
(i.e. not part of the group) can be associated with this transformation of vertical relationships.
Moreover, the PPL does not lead to any modification in the total quantities of end market supply
in comparison with the reference situation defined in the preceding section since retailer R contents
himself with modifying the distribution of this quantity between the two qualities. The optimal
level of quality of the PPL for the integrated chain as well as the supply associated with it is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
Under (H1)-(H2) and if k0 < ek0 = θ
2c
, the quality selected by the integrated chain is written:
k∗1(k0) =
θ + ck0
3c
(12)
Supply of the k0 and k∗1(k0) is obtained by:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
x∗R = [
2ck0 − (1− 3ξ)θ
3θ
]MR
y∗R = [
θ − 2ck0
3θ
]MR
(13)
The retail prices on the market of retailer R are given by:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ p∗0 = θk0(1− ξ)
p∗1 = θk0(1− ξ) +
2
9c
[θ
2 − ck0(θ + 2ck0)]
(14)
6The assumption (H2) is relevant from an empirical point of view because the PPL never supplies the whole shelf
space.
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The optimal quality adopted by the integrated chain is increasing in k0. In annex we also show
that the k∗1(k0) quality can exceed the k0 value once the ξ ratio is suﬃciently high. Hence, private
initiative of the integrated chain makes it possible to reach a quality level for the product which
would not have been foreseeable using the MQS. Still, one sees that the diﬀerentiation between
the quality of the PPL and the quality of the (k∗1(k0) − k0) standard is shrinking in k0. Hence,
the level of k∗1(k0) approaches that of k0 as the standard is raised. In the case of ek0 ≤ k0, the
diﬀerentiation of the products oﬀered to the clientele of retailer R drops until it cancels itself out for
k∗1(k0) =
ek0 (on the opposite, if ek0 > k0, the qualities k0 and k∗1(k0) are systematically developed
and supplied). The integrated chain progressively decides to increase supply of the quality standard
(x∗R is growing in k0) and to limit the quantities attributed to the PPL (y
∗
R is shrinking in k0).
One can, moreover, see that the ratio
x∗R
y∗R
is growing in k0 and in ξ. Hence, the higher the total
size M of the end market (ξ weak), the more the integrated chain favors supply the PPL at the
expense of the supplying the generic product (since the price of supplying the generic product on
the intermediary market is higher). On the other hand, the size increase of the MR of retailer R
(for example following a merger-acquisition) has no influence on his market segmentation since
x∗R
y∗R
does not depend on MR.
Once can see that the price of quality k0 remains identical to the price p0 defined by (6) within
the framework of reference (since the price is not a function of the total quantity xR+yR of supply
on the market of retailer R). The price of the high quality k1 is growing in k0 until this parameter
reaches a critical size σ =
θ(7− 9ξ)
8c
(we show that σ < ek0 once ξ > 13 ) then begins shrinking in
k0 due to the drop in the product diﬀerentiation between the two qualities.
The question is now to analyze how the created value is shared among the stakeholders of the
chain. To study this point, we placed ourselves within the framework of a negotiation procedure
between the producer group and retailer R. This negotiation concerns the ω1 unit remuneration
price of the producer group.7 For a fixed price ω1 the B(k0,ω1) profits of the producer group and
ΠR(k0,ω1) of retailer R are given by:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ B(k0,ω1) = [ω1 − c1 + (1− λ)∆c]y∗R + (ω∗0 − c0)(αG− y∗R)
ΠR(k0,ω1) = [p∗1 − ω1 − (1− λ)∆c]y∗R + [p∗0 − ω∗0]x∗R
(15)
We suppose that the sharing depends on the bargaining power of each of the participants and
that this bargaining power is uniquely represented by the profit each participant obtains in the
absence of a PPL. Hence, the status quo of the relationship corresponds to the situation of reference
of the preceding section with the respective profits B = GBj and ΠR obtained with the help of
(7). We thus suppose that the remuneration price ω∗1 of the producers engaged is fixed by the Nash
solution by solving the following program:
Max
ω1
(ΠR(k0,ω1)−ΠR)(B(k0,ω1)−B) (16)
7The price ω1 is a mean to share the value created by the integrated chain in practice. Of course, insofar as we
have adopted a “collusive solution concept” (described in Schmalensee, 1987) ex ante maximazing the stakeholders
profit sum, the transfer could be done by sharing the additional profit with the same results.
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One then obtains proposition 4:
Proposition 4
The unit remuneration price ω∗1 of high quality is :
ω∗1 = ω
∗
0 + λ4c+ Γ(k0) (17)
where Γ(k0) =
(θ − 2ck0)2
18c
is decreasing in k0.
Proposition 4 shows how it is possible to fix a unit remuneration price for the producers engaged
on the basis of the price observed on the spot market et by reimbursing the added production costs
actually paid by the latter. In other words, the decision taken ex ante to share the added production
costs linked to quality has no eﬀect. In addition there is a producers’ bonus given by Γ(k0).8 The
value of this bonus is all the lower as the MQS is fixed at a high level, explaining the drop in
product diﬀerentiation between the MQS and the PPL.
In this section we have thus given a theoretical framework for the creation of a PPL so as to
on the one hand define its economic interest for the parties involved and, on the other, to define
the value sharing which could be carried out following a policy of optimal maximization of total
profits. We have also defined an optimal quality level for the PPL and its supply. Still, it is clear
that the set of results depends precisely on the level of the MQS adopted by the public authorities.
This point will be studied in the next section by showing the diverging interests that can exist on
the choice of this standard from the viewpoints of producers, retailers and consumers.
4 Choosing a minimum quality standard
Numerous theoretical works have discussed the interest of public regulations to enhance product
quality through a MQS. It is not obvious a priori that introducing an imposed minimum level of
quality will lead to a higher level of average quality of products oﬀered to consumers. Besanko et
al (1988) showed that creating a MQS could result in prices increases as well as in reduced variety
of products, thus penalizing a fraction of consumers. Other authors took interest in studying
the reduction in the number of companies which could be brought about by the creation of a
MQS, by the eﬀects induced by rising costs caused by the quality to produce (Ronnen, 1991;
Crampes and Hollander, 1995), or by the strategies companies put in place to anticipate the
reinforcement of quality standards (Ecchia and Lambertini, 2001; Lutz et al., 2000). In total, the
theoretical literature remains quite divided over the usefulness and the eﬀects of MQS. Results
thus far obtained remain insuﬃcient for clarifying the debate with which we are here interested.
Particularly, they do not take into account the vertical relationship between companies and their
suppliers or the negotiation power sharing between downstream and upstream companies. One
would suppose that the nature of the vertical relationship has an influence on the sharing of
8We frequently observe in practice supply contracts indexed on spot market prices. One of the goal of such a
method is to overcome the diﬃculties linked to demand hasards. Proposition 4 gives a theoretical expression of
this price fixation method.
11
quality costs between suppliers and the retailer and thus conditions the quality positioning of a
downstream company and their answer to the introduction of MQS.
For the example which interests us, in our introduction we looked at the PPL procedures which
lead to supplying large portions of the end market with products which are more tightly controlled
at the safety level and subjected to more demanding specifications than the products spontaneously
oﬀered on the spot market. But are these procedures based on private operator initiative eﬃcient
from the public interest point of view? How can the intervention of public authorities, particularly
as concerns a MQS, influence them? These are the questions we will be examining in this section.
With reference to public objectives, the standard must be chosen on the based of trade oﬀ
between the interest of production system and the consumers. As we have already shown, such a
minimum quality level has a direct influence over the incentive to develop a PPL and it is not sure
that an extremely high level of certification fosters a good quality/price ratio or eﬃcient market
segmentation from the point of view of consumer surplus. Moreover, compared to the production
system, it might be necessary to distinguish between the interest of upstream producers and that of
retailers since the costs of accessing the market supported solely by the producers while the added
costs associated with higher quality are partially covered by the retailers. Hence, the following
proposition:
Proposition 5
The profit of upstream producers B(k0,ω∗1) is maximized on [k0, k0] with k
∗
0(β) and we have
k∗0(β) < Min{k0,ek0}:
k∗0(β) =
θ
4c
(2− 9β + 3
q
9β2 − 8βξ) (18)
We show that k∗0(β) is increasing in β on [ξ,
1
2
]. The profit ΠR(k0,ω∗1) of retailer R is maximized
on [k0, k0] with the value k0.
The first part of proposition 5 means that the producer group upstream prefers to maintain
a moderate level of MQS, leaving the field free for development of a PPL. The ideal level for a
standard drops with MR end market size (because growing in β). One can moreover see that
retailer R would prefer the highest possible level for the standard. Such a standard would have
the eﬀect of limiting PPL supply (since y∗R is decreasing in ξ) and would even eliminate the PPL
in the case of a low relative capacity level of oﬀer on the market (if ξ <
1
4
).
There is, thus, a divergence of interests between the producer group and retailer R on the
fixation of the MQS. From the producer group point of view, it is not necessary to fix too high a
standard because it will cause too big an increase in production costs. Moreover, one can easily
see that the value k∗0(β) is inferior to the value
k0
2
, which was, from the consumer group point
of view, at its optimum in the reference situation described in the preceding section. Hence, the
possibility of developing a PPL leads the producer group to support a lower MQS than the non
engaged producers. On the other hand, retailer R continues to seek the highest possible level of
standard which would, implicitly, limit development of the PPL. One must, however, keep in mind
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that in this article we consider that the standard is fixed ex ante and that the producers and
retailers did not participate in fixing the level of k0. For this reason, negotiating profit sharing
in the contractual relationship between the producer group and retailer R is carried out on the
basis of the k0 standard, meaning it is not foreseeable that all participants are assured of reciving
what they consider to be the profit they would earn for the ideal k0 value. We do, however, in the
following proposition, show the necessity, from the integrated chain point of view, of leaving an
open field for the development of a PPL.
Proposition 6
Under (H1)-(H2) the profit of the integrated chain is maximized on [k0, k0] with k
∗∗
0 (β) and
we have k∗∗0 (β) < Min{k0,ek0}:
k∗∗0 (β) =
θ
8c
(4− 9β + 3
q
9β2 − 16βξ + 8ξ2) (19)
We show that k∗∗0 (β) is decreasing in β on [ξ,
1
2
].
Hence, from the integrated chain point of view it is preferable to obtain a MQS at a suﬃciently
low level to afterwards justify the creation of a PPL. This optimal level is situated between the
k∗0(β) value sought by the producer group and k0 value sought by retailer R. k
∗∗
0 (β) is all the
lower as the relative production capacity compared to the market size of retailer R (measured by
the parameter β) is high.
We are also in a position to assess the impact of developing a PPL on the consumer surplus
of the customers of retailer R. This impact can be measured again in function of the k0 level of
quality standard, either anticipating or not the development of the PPL. Formally, the consumer
surplus of retailer R consumers, with qualities k0 and k1 sold at prices p0 and p1 at their disposal,
is written:
Wc(k0, k1, xR, yR) =
θ
2MR
[k0x
2
R + k1y
2
R + 2k0xRyR] (20)
One this obtains the surplus Wc(k0) by anticipating the PPL quality k∗1(k0) which can be
adopted by the integrated chain:
Wc(k0) =



MRθk0ξ
2
2
+
MRc
2(ek0 − k0)3
8θ
if k0 ≤Min{k0,ek0}
MRθk0ξ
2
2
if k0 ≥Min{k0,ek0}
(21)
Formulation (21) makes it possible to check in direct that for all levels of quality k0, consumers
get a superior surplus with development of the PPL. Indeed, in the absence of a PPL, consumers
systematically obtain the surplus Wc(k0) =
MRθk0ξ
2
2
whereas in the case of PPL development
(if k0 ≤ Min{k0,ek0}), consumers get a supplementary surplus of MRc2(ek0 − k0)3
8θ
. This property
is, however, relatively intuitive since, with the total quantity oﬀered on the market remaining
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constant, dividing part of the production onto a superior level of quality necessarily increases the
consumers surplus.
One can also see that if the MQS is varied, consumers always prefer the highest possible
standard.
Proposition 7
No matter what the level of parameter ξ, Wc(k0) is maximized in k0 = k0. However, if k0 =
k0, the structure of the oﬀer to consumers varies according to ξ in the following manner:
- if ξ < 1/4, the oﬀer is not segmented and only quality k0 is oﬀered to consumers;
- if ξ > 1/4, both qualities are oﬀered to consumers, the part of the linear supply in k1 growing
with ξ.
No matter what the relationship between the size of the market and total production capacity,
raising the MQS to the highest possible level is desirable from the consumer point of view9. In the
context of low relative capacity, and therefore of a high general price level, positioning a MQS at k0
is incompatible with the existence of a PPL diﬀerentiated from the standard. On the contrary, for
higher levels of relative capacity, the diﬀerentiation procedures carried out by the retailers remain
possible even if the public authorities raise the MQS to k0. Hence, the defection of part of the
consumers (for example upon the occasion of food safety crisis) can explain the development of a
PPL.
5 Conclusion
In the face of the problems posed by recent food safety crises, and, in general, by the worries
about the quality of products oﬀered, the question confronting public authorities is whether, how
and to what degree they must reinforce the quality and product security norms and standards.
Without claiming to fix this critical size of the standard here, which would require developing
more precise technical arguments and an econometric estimation of the model, one can see that
an important element in the debate concerns the costs resulting from such quality standards and
sharing these costs between producers, retailers and consumers. Indeed, the imposed standards
determine the level of production, certification and control costs. Moreover, restoring the consumer
trust implies high investment in communication. The trade oﬀ which must be carried out by the
public authorities is, hence, conditioned by the way quality and food security develops, varying
the earnings of each type of actor.
Analysis of the procedures using PPL implemented by large scale retailing shows that the
question of interaction between the level of the MQS and the diﬀerentiation strategies put in place
by the private operators must be given top priority attention when public authorities reflect on the
9Maybe, this result would not be obtained if the assumption concerning the supply inelasticity at the producers
level is modified. Indeed, we assumed that the quality standard increase does not modify the total quantity sold by
the producers. But the production cost increase could lead some producers to be bankrupt, decrease the quantities
and increase the retail prices. In this case, producers and consumers could be penalized by a too high increase of
the MQS.
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question. With this point in mind, the proposed model makes it possible to point out the following
facts:
- The interest of diﬀerentiation based on a PPL all the stronger for the retailer if the level
of the standard is low. The “mad cow” crisis which, at least from the consumer’s point of view,
can be interpreted as revealing too low a level of standard, for this reason lead retailers to create
PPL. Still, for the retailer, raising the MQS reduces the interest of these PPL as far as supply on
the spot market “without constraint” is concerned. The higher the MQS, the higher the required
quality level of the PPL; but at the same time, its price increases even as its place in the linear
shrinks until it finally disappears when diﬀerentiation costs become too high. Stated diﬀerently,
the more public authorities raise the requirements on the MQS to appease consumer fears, the
more diﬀerentiation procedures carried out by retailers become diﬃcult to implement.
- Retailer earnings are higher when the standard is high. Indeed, in this case retailers can
dispense with setting up contacts and simply acquire standard secured products on the spot market
forcing competition among suppliers, that is to say, among the very participants who alone support
the increased production costs created by the standard (whereas in the case of a PPL the producer
supports higher costs but the retailer covers part of the control costs).
- For the producers, raising the MQS is favorable, but it leads to added costs which he must
cover and which, after a certain threshold, reduce their earnings. The producers maximize their
profits when the MQS is such that standard product and the PPL co-exist in the shelf space. What
is more, the level of standard which maximizes their profits is lower in the presence of a PPL than
simply on the spot market alone.
- As far as consumers are concerned, they prefer a high level MQS, without PPL if there is no
over capacity in the production regime, with PPL if over capacity is high.
- From the public authorities’ point of view, reasoning in terms of maximization of the global
surplus, raising the MQS must be envisage up to an intermediate level between k∗0(β), the value
for which the engaged producer profit is maximized, and k0, the value for which retailer profit
and consumer surplus are maximized. It is, however, important to note that in a wide range of
situations the existence of the PPL created by retailers makes it possible to raise the average level
of quality above that accessible by the sole intervention of the public authorities.
These results are, however, based on certain hypotheses which should be reconsidered in further
research. Hence, the hypothesis of producer oﬀer inelasticity could be dropped (even if, in certain
concrete cases, this hypothesis is perfectly valid) since the increase in production costs linked
to raising the standard could lead to a drop in product volumes. Similarly, we have supposed
that retailers had a local monopoly. Now, this hypothesis, which we justify empirically, probably
produces eﬀects which should be identified by examining the impact of real competition between
retailers if one wants to do a multiproduct analysis. On this last point concerning competition
between retailers, it is clear that marketing policies and communication investments play a key
role, making them indissociable from restoring consumer confidence. Hence, the introduction of
retailing costs would be necessary in a quantified evaluation of this type of model.
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Appendix
This appendix presents all the calculations needed to demonstrate the propositions 1 to 7. From
the benchmark situation, two others cases can happen : either both qualities are supplied, or only
the high quality is supplied.
Let us assume that the integrated chain supplies both qualities. Given ω0 (the spot market
price) and the qualities (k0, k1), the profit maximization program (A1) of the integrated chain is :
Max
(xR,yR)
Π(k1, xR, yR) = (p1(xR, yR)− c1)yR + (p0(xR, yR)− ω0)xR + (ω0 − c0)(αG− yR) (A1)
with : ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
p0(xR, yR) =
θk0
MR
(MR − xR − yR)
p1(xR, yR) =
θ
MR
(k1MR − k0xR − k1yR)
(A2)
First-order conditions relative to partial derivatives with respect to xR and yR give:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
∂Π
∂xR
= 0⇐⇒MR(θk0 − ω0)− 2θk0(xR + yR) = 0
∂Π
∂yR
= 0⇐⇒MR(θk1 − ω0 −∆c)− 2θk0xR − 2θk1yR = 0
(A3)
Thus, when the retailer R chooses to sell both qualities k0 et k1, the marketed quantities are
obtained by solving (A3). It gives :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
xR(ω0, k0, k1) =
MR
2
[
k0∆c− ω0(k1 − k0)
θk0(k1 − k0)
] =
MR
2θ
[c(k1 + k0)−
ω0
k0
]
yR(ω0, k0, k1) =
MR
2
[1− ∆c
θ(k1 − k0)
] =
MR
2θ
[θ − c(k1 + k0)]
(A4)
Otherwise, each retailer r = 1, ..., R− 1 supplies only k0 quality on his market Mr and the sold
quantity is xr(ω0) =
Mr
2
[
θk0 − ω0
θk0
]. Then, the total demand on the spot market is :
D(ω0) =
RX
r=1
xr(ω0) =
k0∆cMR + (k1 − k0)[(θk0 − ω0)M − θk0MR]
2θk0(k1 − k0)
(A5)
The total oﬀer on the spot market is K − yR(ω0, k0, k1) and the ω0 price is obtained as the
solution to the equation K − yR(ω0, k0, k1) = D(ω0). Introducing the parameter ξ =
K
M
one can
obtain the equilibrium spot market price ω∗0 (proposition 2):
ω∗0 = θk0(1− 2ξ) (A6)
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Using (A4), we obtain the quantities sold by the retailer R :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
xR(ω
∗
0, k0, k1) =
MR
2θ
[c(k1 + k0)− θ(1− 2ξ)]
yR(ω
∗
0, k0, k1) =
MR
2θ
[θ − c(k1 + k0)]
(A7)
The solution given by (A7) is foreseeable as soon as the following conditions are fulfilled:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
xR(ω
∗
0, k0, k1) > 0⇔ k1 >
θ(1− 2ξ)
c
− k0
yR(ω
∗
0, k0, k1) > 0⇔ k1 <
θ
c
− k0
(A8)
As the quality k1 does not influence the spot market price ω∗0, we directly obtain the optimal
quality k∗1 using the envelop theorem :
∂Π[k1, xR(ω0, k0, k1), yR(ω0, k0, k1)]
∂k1
=
∂Π(k1, xR, yR)
∂k1
¯¯¯¯
(xR(ω0,k0,k1),yR(ω0,k0,k1))
= θ − θ
MR
yR(ω
∗
0, k0, k1)− 2ck1
= θ + ck0 − 3ck1
(A9)
Thus, when k∗1(k0) is strictly superior to k0, we obtain :
k∗1(k0) =
θ + ck0
3c
(A10)
and :
k∗1(k0) > k0 ⇐⇒ k0 < ek0 = θ2c (A11)
We check the equilibrium conditions given by (A8) :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
k∗1(k0) >
θ(1− 2ξ)
c
− k0 ⇔ k0 >
θ(1− 3ξ)
2c
k∗1(k0) <
θ
c
− k0 ⇔ k0 <
θ
2c
(A12)
The relations (A11) and (A12) demonstrate the propositions 1 to 3. Defining ek
0 =
θ
2c
; k0 =
θ(1− 2ξ)
c
and k0 =
θ(1− 3ξ)
2c
, we obtain:
• If k0 ≥Min{ek0 , k0}, the high quality production is not set up by the integrated chain (which
ends the demonstration of proposition 1).
• If k0 ≤Min{0, k0}, the high quality production is set up by the integrated chain but not the
low quality production.
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• If Min{0, k0} < k0 < Min{ek0 , k0} both qualities are producted and the high quality k∗1(k0)
is given by (A10). The high quality can be greater than the maximum value k0 of the MQS
(k∗1(k0) > k0) as soon as k0 > ρ with ρ =
6θ
c
(
1
3
− ξ). Then, ρ > k0 if and only if ξ <
1
4
. Thus if
ξ <
1
4
, we get k∗1(k0) < k0. If
1
4
< ξ <
1
3
, we get k∗1(k0) > k0 if and only if k0 > ρ and if ξ >
1
3
we
always get k∗1(k0) > k0.
Otherwise, using (A7), we get the equilibrium quantities sold by the retailer R :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
x∗R(k0) = xR(ω
∗
0, k0, k
∗
1(k0)) =
MR[2ck0 − (1− 3ξ)θ]
3θ
y∗R(k0) = yR(ω
∗
0, k0, k
∗
1(k0)) =
MR(θ − 2ck0)
3θ
(A13)
We check that x∗R(k0) + y
∗
R(k0) = ξMR.
Then, it is possible to calculate the retail prices using (A2) and (A13):¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ p0(x∗R(k0), y∗R(k0)) = θk0(1− ξ)
p1(x
∗
R(k0), y
∗
R(k0)) =
1
3
[2θk1 + θk0(1− 3ξ) + 2ck0(k1 − k0)]
(A14)
Substituting k∗1(k0) for k1 we obtain the equilibrium prices :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ p∗0 = θk0(1− ξ)
p∗1 = θk0(1− ξ) +
2
9c
[θ
2 − ck0(θ + 2ck0)]
(A15)
We check that
∂p∗1
∂k0
=
8c
9
(σ − k0) with σ =
θ(7− 9ξ)
8c
and that σ < ek0 if and only if ξ > 13 .
The proposition 4 is demonstrated by solving the following program:
MaxΦ(
ω1
ω1) = (ΠR(k0,ω1)−ΠR)(B(k0,ω1)−B) (A16)
In the case where both qualities are supplied, we have :¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ B(k0,ω1) = [ω1 − c1 + (1− λ)∆c]y∗R + (ω∗0 − c0)(αG− y∗R)
ΠR(k0,ω1) = [p1 − ω1 − (1− λ)∆c]y∗R + [p0 − ω∗0]x∗R
(A17)
As we know that
∂B(k0,ω1)
∂ω1
= −∂ΠR(k0,ω1)
∂ω1
= yR and p∗0−ω∗0 = θk0ξ, we get the contractual
price ω∗1 maximising Φ(ω1) :
ω∗1 = ω0 + λ∆c+
1
2
(p1 − p0 −∆c) (A18)
Using (A14), we obtain :
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ω∗1 = ω0 + λ∆c+
1
4
(k1 − k0)[θ − c(k0 + k1)] (A19)
Then we get the premium Γ(k0) =
1
4
(k1− k0)[θ− c(k0+k1)] substituting k1 by the value given
in (A10) :
Γ(k0) =
(θ − 2ck0)2
18c
(A20)
Substituting ω∗1 into (A17), we obtain:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
B∗(k0) = B(k0,ω
∗
1) =MR[βk0[θ(1− 2ξ)− ck0] +
(θ − 2ck0)3
54cθ
]
Π∗R(k0) = ΠR(k0,ω1) =MR[θk0ξ
2 +
(θ − 2ck0)3
54cθ
]
(A21)
The first-order condition
∂B∗(k0)
∂k0
= 0 has only one root, k∗0(β), corresponding to a local
maximum:
k∗0(β) =
θ
4c
(2− 9β + 3
q
9β2 − 8βξ) (A22)
Then we easily check that under (H1), k∗0(β) > k0 and otherwise k
∗
0(β) <
k0
2
. Thus the profit
of the producer group is always maximum for k∗0(β) (k
∗
0(β) ∈ [k0,Min{k0,ek0}]).
For the retailer R, the condition
∂Π∗R(k0)
∂k0
= 0 leads to the following optimal value k0 =ek0(1 + 3ξ). As this value is greater than Min{k0,ek0}, thus Π∗R(k0) is maximised for Min{k0,ek0}.
Under (H1) et (H2), we demonstrate the proposition 5 calculating the integrated chain profit
with respect to k0.
• In the simplest case where only the low quality k0 is supplied, we obtain from (A1):
Π∗(k0) =MRθk0ξ2 +MRβk0[θ(1− 2ξ)− ck0] (A23)
Thus:
∂Π∗(k0)
∂k0
> 0⇐⇒ k0 < η(β) =
θ[ξ2 + β(1− 2ξ)]
2βc
(A24)
Nevertheless, we easily check that under (H1), η(β) < ek0 . Thus, the profit of the integrated
chain is maximised for a value lower than ek
0 which allows the setting up of a PPL.
• When both qualities are supplied, the profit Π∗(k0) is obtained for k∗1(k0) with the equation
Π∗(k0) = B∗(k0) +Π∗R(k0) and (A21):
Π∗(k0) =MRθk0ξ2 +MRβk0[θ(1− 2ξ)− ck0] +
MR(θ − 2ck0)3
27cθ
(A25)
Then, we obtain:
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9θ
MR
∂Π∗(k0)
∂k0
= −2(θ − 2ck0)2 + 9βθ(θ − 2ck0) + 9θ
2
ξ(ξ − 2β) (A26)
The first-order condition
∂Π∗(k0)
∂k0
= 0 has only one root, k∗∗0 (β) inside the interval [k0,Min{k0,ek0}[.
The retailer’s profit is maximised for :
k∗∗0 (β) =
θ
8c
[4− 9β + 3
q
9β2 − 16βξ + 8ξ2] (A27)
To obtain the consumers surplus, we first calculate the surplus when only the quality k0 is
oﬀered to the consumers :
Wc(k0) =MR[
Z θ
p0/k0
(θk0 − p0)f(θ)dθ] =
MRk0
2
(θ − p0
k0
)2 =
MRθk0ξ
2
2
(A28)
In this case, the surplus Wc(k0) is increasing in k0.
When both qualities k0 and k1 are sold at the retail prices p0 and p1 (which depend on the
quantities xR and yR given by (A7), the surplus of consumers buying products in the stores of R,
is given by:
Wc(k0, k1, xR, yR) =MR[
Z bθ
p0/k0
(θk0 − p0)f(θ)dθ +
Z θ
bθ (θk1 − p1)f(θ)dθ] (A29)
Then we obtain the surplus with respect to the quantities and qualities oﬀered to the consumers:
Wc(k0, k1, xR, yR) =
θ
2MR
[k0x
2
R + k1y
2
R + 2k0xRyR] (A30)
Using (A27), we get an explicit formula of Wc(k0) =Wc(k0, k∗1(k0), x
∗
R, y
∗
R) which is :
Wc(k0) =
MR
18θ
[9k0θ
2
ξ2 +
1
3c
(θ − 2ck0)3] =
MRθk0ξ
2
2
+
MRc
2(ek0 − k0)3
8θ
(A31)
Then we get:
[
∂Wc(k0)
∂k0
=
MR
18θ
[9θ
2
ξ2 − 2(θ − 2ck0)2] > 0]⇔ [k0 > τ =
θ
2c
(1− 3
√
2
2
ξ)] (A32)
The parameter τ corresponds to a local minimum of Wc(k0). Thus, the consumers surplus is
maximised only for Min{0, k0} or k0.
Using (A28), it is possible to determine the consumers surplus when k0 = k0 :
Wc(k0) =
MRθ
2
ξ2(1− ξ)
4c
(A33)
For the k0 value, we have to distinguish two cases : first, if k0 < ek0 i.e if ξ ≥ 1
4
(in this case,
both qualities are supplied) ; second, if k0 > ek0 i.e si ξ < 1
4
(in this case, only the low quality is
supplied). From (A28) and (A29), we obtain:
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Wc(k0) =



MRθ
2
ξ2(1− 2ξ)
2c
si ξ <
1
4
MRθ
2
(1− ξ)2(10ξ − 1)
54c
si ξ ≥ 1
4
(A34)
• If ξ < 1
4
, we have Wc(k0) > Wc(k0).
• If ξ ≥ 1
4
, we haveWc(k0) < Wc(k0) if and only if 47ξ
2−22ξ+2 > 0, i.e if ξ > bξ = 11 +√24
47
w
0.34. Nevertheless, in this case k0 < 0 (because ξ >
1
3
) and using (A31), we get Wc(0) =
MRθ
2
64c
.
Finally, we obtain Wc(k0) > Wc(k0) if and only if ξ ≤ bξ w 0.34.
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